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COMPELLED SUBSIDIES AND ORIGINAL MEANING

Jud Campbell*
"Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his
supreme will that ... to compel a man to furnish contributions
of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves
and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical."
-Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom 1
ABSTRACT

The rule against compelled subsidization of speech is at the
forefront of modem First Amendment disputes. Challenges to
mandatory union dues, laws preventing discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, and the federal "contraceptive
mandate" have all featured variants of the anti-subsidization
principle, reasoning that the government cannot compel people
to support the objectionable activities of others. But the literature
currently fails to evaluate modem compelled-subsidy doctrine in
terms of the original meaning of the First Amendment. This
Essay takes up that task.
Approaching any question of original meaning requires a
willingness to encounter a constitutional world that looks very
different from our own. And that is especially true when it comes
to the First Amendment. In certain contexts, some Founders
argued that compelled subsidies violated their rights. But these
were contested arguments. The challenge, then, is to situate
Founding Era ideas in a historical frame that may bear little
resemblance to modem law. Such a frame, this Essay argues,
indicates that rights of expression and religious exerciseundergirded by freedoms of thought and conscience-neither
entirely excluded nor inviolably privileged arguments against
compelled subsidies. Rather than providing determinate
answers, the Founding-Era conception of rights encouraged
active debate about the boundaries of governmental power.
Compelled-subsidy doctrine thus sits in a precarious positionwithin the bounds of reasonable historical argument but also
deeply novel in its modem rigidity and judicial enforceability.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The author
thanks the editors of the First Amendment Law Review, the participants at its annual
symposium, and the participants at the Stanford Constitutional Law Center
Works-In-Progress Conference for helpful comments. He also thanks Andrew
Hemby and Danny Zemel for valuable research assistance.
1
THOMAS JEFFERSON' A BILL FOR ESTABLISIDNG RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, reprinted in 2
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (J. Boyd ed., 1950) (emphases omitted).
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INTRODUCTION

Compelled-subsidy doctrine generally prevents the
government from forcing individuals to pay for the speech
activities of others. The Supreme Court has held, for instance,
that non-union employees have a First Amendment right against
being legally obliged to fund a union's political advocacy. 2 The
underlying logic of this principle is hardly obvious, 3 but scholars
and judges usually frame it in terms of conscience. 4 Perhaps not
surprising, then, concerns over compelled subsidies frequently
come up in religious freedom debates as well. 5
The constitutional basis for compelled-subsidy doctrine,
however, is deeply contested. "It is simply not true," Robert Post
insists, "that First Amendment concerns are implicated
whenever persons are required to subsidize speech with which
they disagree." 6 Indeed, legally compelled funding of potentially
objectionable speech is routine. "[E]ach of us must pay taxes that
will in part go to spread opinions many of us disbelieve and
abhor," William Baude and Eugene Volokh point out,
2

See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Ed. ofEduc., 431U.S.209, 235 (1977). Public employees
now have a right against funding union bargaining activities as well. See Janus v.
Am. Fed. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
3
See Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 25-26, 35
(2016 ); Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization ofSpeech: Johanns v. Livestock Mktg.
Ass'n, 2005 SUP. CT. REv. 195, 228.
4
See, e.g., James D. Nelson, Corporations, Unions, and the Illusion ofSymmetry, 102 VA.
L. REV. 1969, 1971 (2016 ); Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97
VA. L. REV. 317, 380-82 (2011).
5
For example, claims bought under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a}-(b) (2012), often rely on objections to supporting the
activities of others. See Douglas N eJ aime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars:
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L. J. 2516, 251819(2015) ("[R]eligious objections to being made complicit in the assertedly sinful
conduct of others ... now represent an important part of courts' religious liberties
docket."). These types of religious accommodation claims are generally no longer
viable under the Free Exercise Clause because of the Supreme Court's decision in
Emp't Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held
that individuals do not have a Free Exercise right against the enforcement of neutral,
generally applicable laws. Drawing on a similar anti-subsidization rationale, a group
of scholars has asserted a constitutional limit on religious accommodations that
impose burdens on third parties. Forcing individuals to support religious-freedom
claims of others, they argue, is a type of compelled subsidy. See Micah Schwartzman
et al., The Costs of Conscience, 106 KY. L.J. 881, 885 (2018) ("Citizens who bear costs
so that others may observe their faith can rightfully complain that their liberty of
conscience has been implicated."); see also Frederick M. Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van
Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional
Accommodation ofReligion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 379 (2014) ("Applying
RFRA to exempt such employers from the Mandate thus violates the Establishment
Clause prohibition of permissive accommodations that shift the material costs of
accommodation from believers to nonadherents and other third parties.").
6
Post, supra note 3, at 197; see also Gregory Klass, The Very Idea ofa First Amendment
Right Against Compelled Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087 (2005); William
Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 171 (2018).
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concluding that "requiring people only to pay money, whether
to private organizations or to the government, is not a First
Amendment problem at all." 7 And while scholars have also
taken the opposite view, 8 nearly everyone agrees that the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area is mercurial and
undertheorized. 9
Largely unexplored, however, is the historical basis for
compelled-subsidy doctrine. 10 In fact, this area of law seems to
rest almost entirely on an appeal-repeated over and over in
Supreme Court opinions 11 -to Thomas Jefferson's argument
that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors is sinful
and tyrannical." 12 This reliance has led some scholars to refer to
the rule against compelled subsidies as "the Jeffersonian
proposition." 13
This Essay investigates whether compelled-subsidy
doctrine is defensible in terms of the First Amendment's original
meaning-an inquiry of interest to nearly all interpreters. 14 In
short, my argument is that rights of expression and religious
7

Baude & Volokh, supra note 6, at 171.
See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 380-82.
9
See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan & Robert C. Post, Colloquy, It's What's for Lunch:

8

Nectarines, Mushrooms, and Beef-The First Amendment and Compelled Commercial
Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 359, 365-67 (2007) (statement of Kathleen M. Sullivan

describing "doctrinal instability and incoherence" in compelled-subsidy doctrine).
1
°For two of the most thorough explorations of the doctrine, see Klass, supra note 6,
and Baude & Volokh, supra note 6. Neither of these works discusses Founding Era
history, other than brief mentions of Jefferson. See Klass, supra note 6, at 1114; Baude
& Volokh, supra note 6, at 184-85.
11
See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464
(2018); Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305 (1986); Abood v. Detroit Ed. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 n.31 (1977); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 790 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting). Jefferson's quotation is often paired with Madison's
contemporaneous opposition to religious establishments, and particularly his
statement: "Who does not see ... that the same authority which can force a citizen
to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one
establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever?" JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments (1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 295, 300 (Robert
A. Rutland et al., eds., 1973); see, e.g., Abood, 431 U.S. at234 n.31 (citing both
Madison and Jefferson). The explicit anti-establishment focus of Madison's
quotation may account for why the quotation is often either heavily abridged, see,
e.g., Teachers, 475 U.S. at 305, or omitted in later speech-related opinions, see, e.g.,
Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2464; Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 572 (2005)
(Souter, J., dissenting); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 10 (1990).
12
JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 545.
13
See Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 319; Steven D. Smith, Taxes, Conscience, and the
Constitution, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 365, 374 (2006).
14
See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 676 (1999)
("[N]o one doing constitutional theory takes the extreme non-originalist position.");
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding ofFree Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1415 (1990) ("Even opponents oforiginalism
generally agree that the historical understanding is relevant .... ").
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exercise-undergirded by freedoms of thought and conscienceneither entirely excluded nor inviolably privileged constitutional
arguments against compelled subsidies. This may seem odd to
modem readers, but the idea flows from a Founding Era
conception of rights that was often less determinate (and less
judicially enforceable) than how we typically view constitutional
rights today. 15 In particular, rights at the Founding were
generally subject to regulation in promotion of the public good,
and the First Amendment itself "left unresolved whether certain
restrictions . . . promoted the public good." 16 The rigidity of
modem compelled-subsidy doctrine, by comparison, reflects a
libertarian tum in our understanding of rights and, relatedly, a
view of rights as more determinate, judicially enforceable limits
on governmental power. 17
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. It begins in Part I with
a preliminary but important point: Compelled-subsidy doctrine's
reliance on Jefferson is profoundly misplaced for a variety of
methodological and historical reasons. Part II then describes
how the Founders generally approached questions of rights,
focusing particularly on historical understandings of natural
rights-including the rights of conscience, religious exercise, and
expression-and how those rights circumscribed governmental
power. Part III shows how this general framework accounts for
what might otherwise appear to be contradictory historical
evidence about the constitutionality of compelled subsidies.
Overall, the argument against compelled subsidies was
available at the Founding, and thus in some sense can be
understood as consistent with claims of original meaning. But it
also was neither dispositive nor judicially cognizable. The
Founding Era conception of rights thus leaves modem
compelled-subsidy doctrine in a precarious position: within the
bounds of available historical argument but also deeply novel in
its modem rigidity and judicial enforceability.
I. RECONSIDERING JEFFERSON

Compelled-subsidy doctrine flows from a basic axiom of
modem First Amendment law: the government cannot force
15

See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246 (2017)
[hereinafter Campbell, Natural Rights]; Jud Campbell, Judicial Review and the
Enumeration ofRights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 569 (2017) [hereinafter Campbell,
Judicial Review]; Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 85 (2017) [hereinafter Campbell, Republicanism].
16
Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 256.
17
See Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 35 (2018)
("[T]he presumptive absolutism that characterizes the modern frame [for evaluating
American constitutional rights is] an artifact of the second half of the twentieth
century.").
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people to express a particular view or idea. 18 Indeed,
constitutional protections in this field are especially robust
because, as the Supreme Court has explained, "[w]hen speech is
compelled . . . individuals are coerced into betraying their
convictions." 19 Compelling individuals to speak, in other words,
may force them to violate their consciences. 2° Consequently,
even when the government otherwise has authority to compel
speech, the First Amendment provides a right of exemption for
objectors. 21 Compelling a person to subsidize the speech of other
private speakers," the Court has explained, "raises similar First
Amendment concerns." 22
Although it has never attempted a historical defense of
compelled-subsidy doctrine, the Supreme Court routinely
invokes Thomas Jefferson's famous line that "to compel a man
to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and
tyrannical." 23 That reliance, this Part argues, is deeply
problematic. It begins by explaining why Jefferson's statement
does not support a right against compelled subsidies. The Part
then explains how Jefferson's ideas about religious freedom were
not widely held at the Founding and are thus an unreliable guide
to the First Amendment's original meaning.
A. The Fallacy ofthe Jeffersonian Proposition

Compelled-subsidy doctrine's reliance on Jefferson is off
the mark. First and foremost, Jefferson was not asserting a
conscience-based right against compelled subsidies, and
certainly not one enforceable as a matter of constitutional law.
Rather, Jefferson proposed a wholesale denial of any
governmental authority over religious matters. 24 Faithfully
adhering to Jefferson's ideas, rather than selectively quoting one

18

SeeW. Va. Ed. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2488, 2464 (2018).
20
See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 380-82.
21
See Barnette, 319 at 642; see also Wooleyv. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
22
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464.
23
JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 545. See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464, Teachers v.
Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305 (1986); Abood v. Detroit Ed. ofEduc., 431 U.S. 209, 234
n.31 (1977); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 790 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
24
JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 545. Mark Storslee makes a similar observation about
James Madison's argument in the famous Memorial and Remonstrance. See Mark
Storslee, Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm, 86
Umv. Cm. L. REv. (forthcoming 2019) ("[Madison's] argument was not based on the
idea that any undesired cost associated with religion should be prohibited .... Tax
support schemes were objectionable because they effectively deprived all citizensthose who gave to churches willingly and those who did not-of the freedom to
'render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as [they] believe[d] to be
acceptable to him."').
19
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line in the preamble of his proposal, would lead to a radically
different approach to modern doctrine. 25
But the problem is deeper. Jefferson firmly rejected the
idea of constitutionally required religious accommodations,
making him a perplexing (and certainly unwitting) progenitor of
modern conscience-based rights against compelled subsidies. As
Michael McConnell points out, "Jefferson espoused a strict
distinction between belief, which should be protected from
governmental control, and conduct, which should not." 26
Jefferson was concerned about individual conscience, to be sure,
but his approach to addressing that concern was a sweeping denial
of governmental power over the field of religion-while
remammg opposed to mandatory rights of religious
accommodation. Relying on Jefferson to support a
conscience-based right thus turns history on its head.
Moreover, even if reliance on Jefferson were internally
consistent, Jefferson explicitly disclaimed that his argument was
legally binding. The Bill for Religious Freedom-effectively a
legislative resolution-straightforwardly announced that it had
"no effect in law." 27 Indeed, Justice Scalia emphasized this fact
when he presented a historical case against rights of religious
accommodation under the Free Exercise Clause. Historical
evidence about "what was thought to be legislatively or even
morally desireable" during the 1780s religious freedom debates
in Virginia, he wrote in City ofBoerne v. Flores, do not necessarily
"describe what was constitutionally required (and judicially
enforceable)." 28 The exact same point applies to reliance on the
Jeffersonian proposition in the context of compelled subsidies.
It hardly needs mentioning that picking out an isolated
statement in a preamble and then extending that statement well
beyond its historical context is not a sound approach to
constitutional interpretation. For instance, the preamble of the
Bill for Religious Freedom also declares that "to suffer the civil
magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion and to
restrain the profession or propagation of principles on
supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy," 29
leading some scholars to conclude that the First Amendment's
Speech and Press Clauses originally barred sedition
25

Modern doctrine provides for challenges to the application of compelled subsidy
laws against those who object to the enforcement of the laws against them. It is not a
way of "facially" challenging the laws themselves.
26
McConnell, supra note 14, at 1451.
27
JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 546.
28
521 U.S. 507, 541 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). In this passage, Justice
Scalia was discussing James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, but the argument plainly applies just as much to the Bill for Religious
Freedom.
29
JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 546.
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prosecutions. 30 Granted, this inference has rhetorical force
today. 31 But it also turns out to be a fallacious way of
understanding constitutional history. 32 And that is because the
inference attributes far, far too much weight to a single line in the
preamble of a single state bill that by its own terms had "no effect
in law. " 33
In fact, Justice Scalia is not the only proponent of
compelled-subsidy doctrine who has nonetheless decried
reliance on Jefferson with respect to other aspects of First
Amendment law. "It is impossible to build sound constitutional
doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional
history," then-Justice Rehnquist wrote in dissent in Wallace v.
Jaffeee, "but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been
expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor [of a
wall of separation between church and state] for nearly 40
years." 34 Jeffersonian sound bites, Rehnquist implies, are not a
reliable guide to constitutional meaning.
Recent developments in constitutional theory reinforce
this point. For several decades, interpreters have gravitated
toward arguments about original meaning of the Constitution's
words and phrases-usually in reference to a provision's legal
meaning, public meaning, or some blend of the two-and away
from selectively quoting the intentions of particularly revered
Framers (or, in Jefferson's case, non-Framers). 35 On this view,
30
31

See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 31 (1920).
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) ("Although

the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has
carried the day in the court of history.").
32
See LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960) ("[The Framers of the First Amendment] did not
intend to give free rein to criticism of the government that might be deemed seditious
libel .... ");Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15. Indeed, even "Jefferson was
quite willing to impose limitations on political expression." Michael P. Downey,
Note, The Jeffersonian Myth in Supreme Court Sedition Jurisprudence, 76 WASH. U. L. Q.
683, 685 (1998).
33
JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 546.
34
472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although the Supreme Court
has previously described Jefferson, along with his political ally James Madison, as
playing "leading roles" in the "drafting and adoption" of the First Amendment,
Everson v. Ed. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947); Abingdon Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing Jefferson
and Madison as the "architects" of the First Amendment), Rehnquist noted that
"Jefferson was of course in France at the time the constitutional Amendments
known as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and ratified by the States."
Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35
Some scholars emphasize a search for original legal meaning. See, e.g., William
Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2355 n.16 (2015); William
Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law ofInterpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1131
(2017); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language
ofthe Law, 59 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1321 (2018); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a
Theory ofLegal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817, 819 (2015); John F.
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of"Cruel", 101 GEO.GEORGETOWN L. J. 441, 464
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the views of one man-even an iconic man like Jefferson-make
little difference. What matters, instead, is the meaning of the
Constitution to a broader audience. 36
Moreover, even if Jefferson's isolated statement were
good evidence of the First Amendment's original meaning, it
would likely undermine modem doctrine. Nowadays, First
Amendment law strictly separates compelled subsidies for private
speech, which are constitutionally proscribed, and compelled
subsidies for governmental speech, which raise no First
Amendment problem at all. 37 The latter principle is crucial given
the ubiquity of viewpoint-based governmental speechsupported, of course, through compulsory taxes. 38 Without
exempting governmental speech, compelled-subsidy doctrine
would founder. But this exemption for governmental speech has
no grounding in the Jeffersonian proposition. To be sure,
Jefferson was objecting to a proposed scheme that would have
required Virginians to fund private ministers-not govemmentrun religious services. But Jefferson's objections did not tum on
this aspect of the funding scheme. Indeed, it seems likely that
direct governmental propagation of religious views would have
(2017); cf Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV.
551 (2006) (endorsing a version of originalism that looks to original common law
rules and common law methods). Others focus more on original public meaning. See,
e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning ofthe Commerce Clause, 68 U. Cm. L.
REV. 101, 105 (2001); Vasan Kesavan & Michael S. Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of
the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L. J. 1113, 1120 (2003). For a
discussion of how these inquiries can overlap, see, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, District
of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 923, 968-70 (2009); cf
Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1745,
1758 (2015) ("For all of the attention given to the difference between 'original public
meaning' originalism, and originalism based on the understandings of the framers
and ratifiers, no one has identified nontrivial examples of actual constitutional
interpretation that turn on the distinction.").
36
These arguments might not be determinative on their own. Jefferson's claim, after
all, was enshrined (with some revisions) in the Act for Establishing Religious
Freedom-an official act of the Virginia General Assembly in 1786 that was
reprinted in newspapers in several other states. See, e.g., PENN. PACKET (Phila.), Feb.
2, 1786, at 3. But as this Part shows, the arguments in the Act did not reflect the
dominant understanding of religious freedom at the time.
37
See Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 370. For illustrations of the modern doctrine,
see, e.g., Johanns v. LivestockMktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) ("Our
compelled-subsidy cases have consistently respected the principle that compelled
support of a private association is fundamentally different from compelled support of
government. Compelled support of government-even those programs of
government one does not approve-is of course perfectly constitutional, as every
taxpayer must attest.") (quotation marks and alteration omitted); Ed. of Regents v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) ("The government, as a general rule, may
support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting
parties. Within this broader principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by the
government will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its
own policies.").
38
See generally Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B. C. L.
REv. 695(2011) (discussing the "governmental speech" exception to general First
Amendment principles).
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aggravated the constitutional problem for Jefferson. Again,

whatever the merits of modern doctrine, its apparent reliance on
Jefferson is self-defeating.
Scholars occasionally also point out that Jefferson was
talking about religious freedom, and not rights of conscience more
generally. 39 According to William Baude and Eugene Volokh,
"Jefferson was specifically talking about the propagation of
religious opinions, which is regulated by a separate constitutional
provision-the Establishment Clause. " 40 This critique, however,
strikes me as less persuasive. To be sure, Jefferson was talking
about religious freedom, and he certainly saw unique harms in
religious dogmatism. Yet many of the ideas in his proposed Bill
for Religious Freedom were rooted in broader freedoms of
thought and opinion. 41 He was explicating principles of natural
law42 and natural rights 43 -not a religion-focused Establishment
Clause, which Virginia then lacked.
In the end, however, the fact that Jefferson was relying on
natural-rights principles, rather than a state-level ban on religious
establishments, further undermines modern reliance on
Jefferson. Understanding why requires a closer look at the
actions of the First Congress when it considered whether to
propose constitutional amendments (later known as the "Bill of
Rights."). 44
39

My reference here assumes that religious objections are a variant of "rights of
conscience" more generally. Importantly, however, that was not the dominant
linguistic practice at the Founding, see McConnell, supra note 14, at 1483-84 (noting
the interchangeable usage of "liberty of conscience" and "free exercise of religion" at
the Founding), and even today rights of "conscience" can be defined in various
ways, see Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1457, 1489-94 (discussing other definitions of"conscience").
40
Baude & Volokh, supra note 6, at 184-85 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted);
see also Klass, supra note 6, at 1114 ("Jefferson's statement ... concerns only the
compelled subsidization of religious activities .... ");cf Schwartzman, supra note 4,
at 323 n.13 (arguing that Jefferson's point, though made in the context of religious
assessments, is not properly limited to that context).
41
See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OFVIRGINlA 159 (William
Peden ed., 1955).
42
That is, the dictates of reason-notwithstanding the fact that Jefferson couched
these ideas in terms of divine will.
43
JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 546--47 ("[T]he rights hereby asserted, are of the
natural rights of mankind."). Jefferson was drawing on a long tradition of
philosophers who viewed the right to religious belief as inalienable. See, e.g., FRANCIS
HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY AND
VIRTUE: IN Two TREATISES 185 (Knud Haakonssen ed., Liberty Fund Inc. 2004)
(1726); JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, reprinted in Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 246 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003)
(arguing from natural-rights principles that "nobody ought to be compelled in
matters of religion either by law or force"); JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 82 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1690) ("[I]n bare naked
Perception the Mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot
avoid perceiving.") (emphasis in original).
44
See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTION: How THE BILL
OF RIGHTS BECAME THE BILL OF RIGHTS 5 (2018).
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B. The Idiosyncracy ofJefferson

By the time Congress proposed the amendments in 1789,
Americans had articulated two competiting views about the
relationship between the inalienable right of conscience and
various aspects of religious establishments, including religious
assessments. The dominant view seems to have been that
religious establishments did not necessarily violate rights of
conscience. 45 Indeed, state constitutions generally treated rights
of conscience (or free exercise) distinctly from their allowance or
disallowance of religious establishments. 46 But a competing
approach to religious freedom-championed most famously by
Jefferson and Madison in their fight against religious assessments
in Virginia-saw a fundamental opposition between conscience
rights and religious assessment schemes. So which of these
understandings of religious freedom prevailed when Congress
debated and passed the First Amendment?
Debates and votes in the House of Representatives (our
only direct source of evidence 47 ) comport with the view that
rights of conscience were not inherently incompatible with
religious establishments. In other words, Jefferson's arguments
in the Bill for Religious Freedom apparently did not shape how
the members of the First Congress thought about religious
freedom. 48 Evidence demonstrating this point begins with the
structure of Madison's initial proposal.
When Madison proposed amendments on June 8, 1789,
he insisted on adding protection for the natural rights of
expressive freedom and religious conscience against the federal
and state governments alike. 49 Madison's proposed Establishment
45

My point here is, of course, not that any state establishment scheme would
necessarily comport with free exercise. One can imagine an obvious violation offreeexercise rights if a state forced everyone to worship at a particular church. Rather,
my point is that the dominant understanding of free exercise rights was not
inherently incompatible with more tolerant forms of religious establishmentscontrary to Jefferson's innovative argument in the mid-l 780s. See Philip A.
Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate about Equal Protection
and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 353 (noting the innovative nature of
Jefferson's position).
46
See Wesley J. Campbell, Religious Neutrality in the Early Republic, 24 REGENT U. L.
REV. 311, 323 [hereinafter Campbell, Religious Neutrality] ("[Establishment-related]
provisions ... were often in separate sections and generally did not affect the scope
of free exercise protections.").
47
Because the Senate proceedings were closed to the public, records of Senate
debates (with rare exception) do not exist.
48
My methodology is a comparison of the logic of the Jeffersonian argument to the
logic of the various proposals and arguments considered in the First Congress. For a
different methodology, arguing more broadly that Jefferson's Bill for Religious
Freedom had very little influence on the Founders, see Mark David Hall, Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance and Jefferson's Statute for Religious Liberty, and the Creation of
the First Amendment, 3 AM. POL. THOUGHT 32(2014).
49
See 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791:

LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES IO (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., Johns
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Clause, by contrast, banned only the creation of "any national
religion," 50 without a comparable limit on state authority. Thus,
although Madison wanted speech and press freedoms and the
"equal rights of conscience" to be protected in the federal
Constitution against both federal and state action, only the federal
government would be federally barred from creating an
established church.
Madison's proposal reveals a simple but crucial point:
Contrary to Jefferson's arguments in the Bill for Religious
Freedom, the natural rights of expressive freedom and religious
conscience did not necessarily ban religious establishments.
Otherwise, the language of Madison's proposed amendments
made no sense: for one thing, the Establishment Clause would
have been superfluous (since a recognition of the inalienable
right of conscience would already have deprived the government
of authority to establish a religion), and for another, the
Establishment Clause's apparent limitation to the federal
government would have been unjustified, so long as states were
also federally bound to respect rights of conscience. "It is indeed
stressing the obvious," Joseph Snee concludes, "that, in
[Madison's] mind at least, ... the establishment of a religion by
law is not per se an infringement of the equal rights of
conscience." 51
Madison's colleagues apparently agreed. Although the
House of Representatives revised his language, it kept the basic
substance and structure of the initial proposal: Protection of
expressive and religious freedom against the federal and state
governments, coupled with an anti-establishment rule to limit
Hopkins Univ. Press 1986) ("The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of
religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall
the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on an pretext infringed.
The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to
publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of
liberty, shall be inviolable."); id. at 11 ("No state shall violate the equal rights of
conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."). For a
more thorough presentation of the drafting history of the First Amendment, see
Vincent Phillip Mufioz, The Original Meaning ofthe Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence
from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1083, 1102-09 (2008). For
identification of religious and expressive freedom as natural rights, see, e.g., James
Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPE RS OF JAMES
MADISON 193, 194 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979) ("[N]atural
rights, retained-as Speech, Con[ science]"); Proposal by Roger Sherman to House
Committee of Eleven (July 21-28, 1789), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 83-84 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997)
(" [C]ertain natural rights which are retained" include the "right[] of conscience" and
the right" of Speaking, writing and publishing ... with decency and freedom."). See
generally, Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15.
50
4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 49' at 10
(emphasis added).
51
Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954
WASH. U. L. Q. 371, 384.
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only federal power. 52 Nobody so much as hinted that the
extension of religious and expressive freedom rights against state
governments might threaten state religious establishments,
notwithstanding the fact that Jefferson's prior arguments against
religious assessments proceeded explicitly from natural-rights
principles. 53 In other words, nobody in the House of
Representatives seems to have interpreted Madison's 1789
proposal in light of Jefferson's arguments several years earlier.
Nor is it likely that members of the House of
Representatives simply overlooked such a startling implication
for state religious establishments. Madison's colleagues were
acutely aware of the political need to protect state religious
establishments. In debates over the proposed amendments,
Representatives Peter Silvester of New York and Benjamin
Huntington of Connecticut each voiced concerns that the
proposed language-"no religion shall be established by law"would be misconstrued in ways that might obstruct the operation
of state religious establishments. 54 It went without saying that
entirely dismantling state religious establishments was a
complete non-starter. 55 Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire
then suggested language that carried the day: "[C]ongress shall
make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of
conscience." 56 With that change, representatives apparently
52

Their proposed third and fourth amendments read: "The Third. Congress shall
make no law establishing religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall
the rights of Conscience be infringed. The Fourth. The Freedom of Speech and of the
Press ... shall not be infringed." 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS, supra note 49, at 36. Meanwhile, the proposed fourteenth amendment
read: "No State shall infringe ... the rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech,
or of the press." Id. at 39.
53
For debates in the House of Representatives over the Establishment Clause, see 11
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS: DEBATES IN THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES: FIRST SESSION, JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1789 1254, 1257, 1260-62
(Charlene B. Bickford et al. eds., John Hopkins Univ. Press 1992).
54
Id. at 1260 (Silvester); id. at 1261-62 (Huntington).
55
See Mufioz, supra note 49, at 1104 ("Proposing an amendment to apply against the
states was audacious in itself; an amendment that would have made a widespread
state practice immediately unconstitutional probably would not have had any chance
of being ratified."). Munoz's qualifier "probably" is unnecessary.
56
Id. at 1262. To be clear, I am not attempting to explicate the meaning of the
Establishment Clause, or, particularly, whether it permits or forbids governmental
support of religion. One scholar has proposed that "limitations [in state
constitutions] on religious establishments imposed a prohibition beyond or different
from taxpayer funding of religion." Vincent Philip Mufioz, Church and State in the
Founding-Era State Constitutions, 4 AM. POL. THOUGHT 1, 26 (2015). This Essay does
not enter that debate. Rather, my point is that the recognition of the natural rights of
religious and expressive freedom (as the House of Representatives proposed to
extend against state governments) did not of their own force forbid state measures,
like religious assessments, that Jefferson and Madison had previously argued were
categorically incompatible with the inalienable right of conscience. In other words,
the First Congress's decision to extend rights of religious and expressive freedom
against state governments, combined with the First Congress's desire not to disturb
existing state laws (like religious assessment schemes in New England), demonstrates
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thought that state religious establishments were sufficiently
guarded against federal interference. And when it came time to
debate the proposal to protect religious and expressive freedom
against state infringement, nobody said anything that suggested
any threat to state establishments of religion. 57
Of course, the Senate ended up deciding not to endorse
the House's proposed amendment that would have limited state
governments. 58 But we do not know why. 59 Senate records from
this period are sparse. The only recorded opposition to the
amendment came in the House of Representatives when Thomas
Tudor Tucker of South Carolina objected that "[i]t will be much
better ... to leave the state governments to themselves, and not
to interfere with them more than we already do." 60 He never
suggested that the amendment would have had any particular
impact on state religious establishments.
Of course, none of this is to deny the historical
importance of the Bill for Religious Freedom to the broader
cause of disestablishment. But records from the House of
Representatives indicate that Jefferson's earlier arguments were
not on the minds of the framers of the First Amendment.
In sum, the Supreme Court's myopic reliance on the
Jeffersonian proposition as a guide to the First Amendment's
original meaning is profoundly flawed. But debunking this
historical mythology does not prove that compelled subsidies are
consistent with the original meaning of the First Amendment.
Far from it. For that inquiry, we must step back into the
eighteenth century and try to comprehend the meaning of the
First Amendment in its own time.

that those rights had a more limited reach than what Jefferson and Madison had
previously argued in Virginia. Whether religious assessments constituted an
"establishment" of religion makes no difference for purposes of this Essay.
57
CONG. REG. [Philadelphia], Aug. 17, 1789, reprinted in I I DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 53, at 1291-92.
58
See 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 49' at
39 n.19.
59
See Mufioz, supra note 49, at 1108 ("No reason [for the Senate's rejection of the
amendment] was recorded, though given that Senators at the time were elected by
state legislatures, it may be that the Senate thought it improper to adopt an
amendment applied against the States."). Interestingly, Justice Brennan posited that
the "amendment was defeated in the Senate by the forces Madison feared most,
those who wanted the states to retain their systems of established churches." William
J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill ofRights and the States: The Revival ofState Constitutions as
Guardians ofIndividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 537 (1986). Brennan, however,
seems to have mistakenly relied on a source that said nothing of the sort. See IRVING
BRANT, JAMES MADISON, THE FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 271 (1950) (discussing
the Senate's rejection of a state-restraining amendment).
6
°CONG. REG. [Philadelphia], Aug. 17, 1789, reprinted in I I DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 53, 1292.
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II. NATIJRAL RIGHTS AT TIIE FOUNDING

The key to a historical understanding of the First
Amendment-as I have argued elsewhere and summarize in this
Part-is to step back from a search for the meaning of particular
rights and instead try to appreciate how the Founders thought
about rights more generally. 61 Indeed, the Founders thought very
differently about rights than we do today.
For most Americans now, a constitutional "right" is a
legally enforceable privilege or immunity-something that the
government has to provide us (e.g., our "right" to a jury trial) or
something that the government cannot take away (e.g., our
"right" to possess personal firearms for self-defense). 62 But
American elites in the late eighteenth century understood their
"rights" differently. For the Founders, rights were divided into
two categories: natural rights and positive rights. And unless we
approach the task of constitutional interpretation on their terms
rather than on ours, the First Amendment's original meaning
will remain elusive.
Natural rights were all the things that we could do simply
as humans, without the intervention of a government. As
Thomas Paine once put it, "[a] natural right is an animal right,
and the power to act it, is supposed . . . to be mechanically
contained within ourselves as individuals. " 63 Eating, walking,
thinking, and praying, for instance, were all things that
individuals could do without a government, so they were all
natural rights. Meanwhile, positive rights were defined explicitly
in terms governmental authority. 64 The rights to a jury trial and
to habeas corpus, for instance, were positive rights because they
were procedures provided by the government.

61
What follows in this Part is mostly derivative of my earlier work, and the text is
based on a short summary of that work in Jud Campbell, What Did the First
Amendment Originally Mean?, RICH. L. MAG. (2018). The innovative moves in this
Essay are limited to Parts I and III.
62
See Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin's Two Conceptions ofRights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 309,
311 (2000) ("I believe [a view of rights as 'trumps'] is the dominant view of rights in
the contemporary political culture (though I do not know how one would prove
that)."). Pildes nonetheless argues that this common conception of rights
inaccurately describes modern rights jurisprudence, see Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights
Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 2 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 725, 729 (1998) ("Rights are not general trumps against appeals to the
common good or anything else; instead, they are better understood as channeling the
kinds of reasons government can invoke when it acts in certain arenas."). I largely
agree. See Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 315-16.
63
THOMAS P AlNE, Candid and Critical Remarks on Letter 1, Signed Ludlow, PA. J. &
WKLY ADVERTISER, June 4, 1777, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS PAlNE 274 (Philips. Forrer ed., Citadel Press 1945).
64
The notion of "positive" rights, then, is contrasted with "natural" rights. It does
not refer to the common distinction between "positive" and "negative" rights.
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With these definitions in view, the Founders had no need
to write out long lists of which types of rights were natural and
which were positive. The distinction, to them, was obvious.
Thinking, believing, speaking, writing, publishing, and
worshiping, for instance, were all things that people could do
without a government, so they were readily recognizable as
natural rights. When James Madison introduced amendments in
the first Congress, for instance, he only mentioned in passing that
the freedoms of speech and conscience were among the "natural
rights, retained." 65 Madison's audience easily understood his
point. Expression and religious belief are innate human
capacities, so they are clearly natural rights.
We still have not quite arrived at the original meaning of
the First Amendment. For that, we need to understand how
natural rights constrained governmental power. Surely the First
Amendment imposes some limits on Congress. (It starts, after
all, with "Congress shall make no law .... ") 66 What were those
limits?
For the Founders, natural rights were rooted in a
philosophical system called social-contract theory. 67 According
to this theory, the proper scope of governmental authority is
discoverable by first imagining our situation as if there were no
government and then considering why we would come together
and agree to form a political society through an agreement
known as a social contract (or "social compact"). 68 The political
society would then agree to a constitution that created a
government and granted it certain powers.
Although some ancillary features of social-contract
theory were contested, virtually every American political leader
in the late 18th century agreed about its core features. 69 Most
importantly, the Founders recognized two crucial limitations
that social-contract theory imposed on governmental power to
restrict natural rights. 7° First, natural rights could be restricted
only when the people themselves consented to the restriction,
either in person or through their political representatives. 71 This
principle was a rallying cry for American colonists advocating
65

James Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPE RS
OF JAMES MADISON 193, 194 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979) (italics omitted).
66
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
67
Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 15, at 87-88.
68
Id. at 88-89. The term "social compact" is more historical, but it is avoided in this
Essay to prevent confusion with the separate notion of "compact" frequently invoked
in historical debates over the nature of the federal union.
69
Id. at 98 (" [A]lthough American elites spoke in radically different ways ... they
widely agreed on the substance-that retained natural rights could be regulated in the
public interest by the people or their representatives.").
70
Id. at 92-93.
71
Id. at 92-93, 97-98.

264

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol.17

for independence rather than submitting to British taxation when
they had no representation in parliament. 72 Second, the
government could restrict natural rights only when doing so
promoted the public good-that is, the aggregate happiness and
welfare of the entire political society. 73 Individuals entering a
political society, John Locke explained in his widely read Second
Treatise, surrender "as much ... natural Liberty ... as the Good,
Prosperity, and Safety of the Society shall require. " 74
As a general matter, therefore, the concept of natural
rights helped define who could restrict individual liberty (i.e., a
representative legislature) and why they could do so (i.e., to
promote the public good). But natural rights were not a set of
determinate legal privileges or immunities that the government
could not abridge. Natural rights, it bears emphasis, could be
restricted by law to promote the good of the society. "[T]he right
to speak and act," American patriot James Otis explained at the
onset of the colonial conflict, "is limited by the law-Political
liberty consists in a freedom of speech and action, so far as the
laws of a community will permit, and no farther." 75 Effectively,
this put the legislature-not judges-in primary control over
how far to restrict expression and how far to extend rights of
religious freedom. The idea of natural rights, in other words, was
primarily philosophical, not legal.
At the same time, the Founders also appreciated that
certain regulations of expression and religious exercise were not
in the public interest and were therefore beyond the scope of
legislative power. 76 The famous "rule against prior restraints"prohibiting the government from requiring pre-approval of
publications-is one example in the context of expression. 77
Another is that well-intentioned criticisms of the government
could not be punished. 78 (Deliberate efforts to mislead the public
were an entirely different matter.) Meanwhile, the Founders
widely agreed the government could not punish individuals or
deprive them of basic civil privileges on the basis of their religious

72
73

Id. at 98.
Id. at 93-94.

74
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT§ 130 (1690), reprinted in Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 156 (Ian
Shapiro ed., 2003).
75
Freeborn American, Bos. GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., Mar. 9, 1767, reprinted
in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO 95, 95 (Leonard w. Levy ed., 1996).
76
Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 291 ("Governmental powers recognized
at common law were presumptively acceptable, while common-law limits on those
powers (such as the rule against prior restraints) recognized presumptively unjustified
abridgments of natural rights.").
77
Id. at 289-90.
78
Id. at 280-87.
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views. 79 The First Amendment thus prevented temporary
legislative majorities from abandoning these settled principles.
How much further the First Amendment went, though,
was up for debate precisely because the Founders often disagreed
about exactly what restrictions of expression promoted the public
good. This conflict was especially clear in the late 1790s as
Americans clashed over the constitutionality of the federal
Sedition Act.
Members of the Federalist Party-the party of President
John Adams-argued that maintaining a republican government
required punishing those who falsely and maliciously criticized
the government. 80 "[E]very individual is at liberty to expose, in
the strongest terms, consistent with decency and truth all the
errors of any department of the government," Federalist jurist
Alexander Addison wrote. 81 But this hardly implied
constitutional protection for deliberately misleading the public.
"Because the Constitution guaranties the right of expressing our
opinions, and the freedom of the press," Federalist congressman
John Allen asked rhetorically, "am I at liberty to falsely call you
a thief, a murderer, an atheist?" 82 Stopping the spread of lies,
Federalists insisted, was essential to maintaining a well-informed
electorate and, thus, a republican government.
In response, Jeffersonian-Republican opponents of the
Sedition Act did not even try to defend the notion that all speech
is beneficial. "It may perhaps be urged, and plausibly urged, that
the welfare of the community may sometimes, and in some
cases, require certain restrictions on [an] unlimited right of
enquiry," Elizabeth Ryland Priestley admitted. 83 The problem
for Republicans, however, was the prospect of governmental
abuses of power. Authority to punish sedition, Priestley
explained, "once conceded, may be extended to every [opinion]
which insidious despotism may think fit to hold out as
dangerous." 84 In other words, Republicans still assessed
questions of free speech in terms of the public good, but they
worried that Federalists were pursuing their own narrow partisan

79

My point here is not to make any effort to settle the precise boundaries of this
right. Rather, it is indisputable that Americans widely accepted basic principles of
religious freedom embodied in, for instance, the Toleration Act. 1 W. & M., ch. 18.
8
°Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 283.
81
ALEXANDER ADDISON, ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE
VIRGINIA ASSEMBLY, ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF SUNDRY OF THE OTHER STATES IN
ANSWER TO THEIR RESOLUTIONS 42 (Philadelphia, Zachariah Poulson, Jr. 1800).
82
8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2097 (1798) (statement of Rep. John Allen).
83
Elizabeth Priestley, On the Propriety and Expediency of Unlimited Enquiry, in THOMAS
COOPER, POLITICAL ESSAYS 62, 63 (Philadelphia, Thomas Cooper ed., 2d ed. 1800).
84
Id. at 63-64.
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interests rather than the general welfare and that these abuses of
power would stifle useful public debate. 85
In sum, the founders thought the First Amendment
required Congress to infringe expressive and religious freedom
only in promotion of the public good, while also guaranteeing
more specific legal rules that had long protected these rights. The
Amendment, in other words, stood for a general principle-one
that left room for considerable debate about how it should be
applied in practice-and also for the entrenchment of more
specific settled rules. The First Amendment thus shaped debate
about expressive and religious freedom while also standing as a
bulwark against constitutional backsliding. The Amendment
was not simply a counter-majoritarian limit on legislative power.
However, once the people agreed on core principles, the
legislature could not turn back.
This process of accumulating and refining constitutional
limits over time through political means is mostly foreign to
Americans today. Rights in the modern sense are countermajoritarian constraints on legislative power, so it seems strange
that their scope could somehow depend on political decisions.
For modern Americans, judges have that job. 86
For people born and raised in the tradition of the
customary British constitution, however, the logic ofrecognizing
constitutional limits through political rather than judicial means
made perfect sense. "A customary law carries with it the most
unquestionable proofs of freedom," explained James Wilson, a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention and later a Supreme
Court justice. 87 Politicians do abuse power, of course. But for the
Founders, once legislators-acting on behalf of the peopleagreed on a constitutional principle, and once that settlement
remained in place for considerable time, the principle became
binding. 88 "[L] ong and uniform custom," English jurist Richard
Wooddeson noted in 1792, "bestows a sanction, as evidence of
universal approbation and acquiescence." 89 It was, in other
words, as if the people themselves had spoken.
The First Amendment fit within this familiar tradition.
Well-established principles about expressive and religious
85

For more detailed analysis of Republic concerns, emphasizing Republican fears of
political bias in the enforcement of a Sedition Act, see Jud Campbell, The Invention of
First Amendment Federalism, 97 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2019).
86
See generally Greene, supra note 17 (assessing American views of rights, including
the development of those views).
87
JAMES WILSON, Municipal Law, reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 549, 569 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
88
Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 290-92.
89
RICHARD W OODDESON, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE: TREATED OF IN THE
PRELIMINARY PART OF A COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46
(London, T. Payne & Son 1783).
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freedom would limit Congress, and judges and juries could
enforce those settled boundaries of governmental authority. But
otherwise the First Amendment would leave the task of defining
the public good to the people and their representatives. For the
founders, judges could not create new limits on governmental
authority. 90
ill. COMPELLED SUBSIDIES

This Part considers historical evidence regarding
compelled subsidies in light of the general framework just laid
out. My argument is that Founding Era rights of expression and
religious exercise-undergirded by freedoms of thought and
conscience-neither entirely excluded nor inviolably privileged
constitutional arguments against compelled subsidies. This Part
begins by applying the theory in Part II to the problem of
compelled subsidies. Next, it shows how that theory maps onto
available historical evidence.
A. Applying a Natural Rights Framework

From the standpoint of social-contract theory, compelled
subsidies plainly infringe natural liberty. Forcing someone to do
something-particularly something that itself does not violate
the natural rights of others-clearly implicates the general
principle that the government may not restrict natural liberty
unless doing so promotes the public good.
Indeed, the expansive breadth of natural rights meant that
the Founders had no need to engage in the extensive
categorization efforts that abound in modern rights
jurisprudence-defining, for instance, what activities count as
"speech" or what activities count as "religious. " 91 This is not to
say that inquiries of this sort were necessarily irrelevant at the
Founding. People back then, for example, could invoke naturalrights premises to argue that government had authority over nonreligious issues but not over religious concerns. 92 But this was
merely an argument-and one that relied on a series of
contestable premises and conclusions about the effects of

°For discussions of the limited nature of Founding Era judicial review, see LARRY

9

D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDIClALREVlEW (2004); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope ofthe American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140--42 (1893); Christopher R.
Green, Clarity and Reasonable Doubt in Early State-Constitutional Judicial Review, 57 S.
TEX. L. REV. 169, 172-83 (2015); John McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 843, 880-904 (2016).
91
Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 287 n.188; see also Greene, supra note 17,
at 38 (noting how, under the modern approach to rights, "analysis is weighted
toward threshold interpretive questions").
92
See, e.g., MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 11.
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governmental power vis-a-vis religion. Someone else might just
as easily argue using entirely different categories-perhaps a
narrower category (e.g., non-harmful religious views) or a broader
one (e.g., thoughts). In other words, terms like "speech" and
"religion" were not references to fixed categories of natural rights
with clearly delineated boundaries. 93 Nor did the First
Amendment suggest anything of the sort. (If it had, the Ninth
Amendment would have immediately dispelled that
suggestion.) 94 In this sense, a constitutionally grounded
argument against compelled subsidization was readily available
at the Founding-either under the First Amendment or under
general principles of social-contract theory.
Nonetheless, this threshold inquiry about the scope of
rights was far less significant back then for the simple reason that
the public good took priority. Forcing individuals to subsidize
objectionable activities-whether related to speech, religion, or
anything else-did not necessarily violate fundamental law. To
be sure, any compelled subsidy-whether in the form of taxes,
personal services, or otherwise-implicated the general principles
of social contract theory, but compelled subsidies were not
therefore categorically disallowed. Consequently, the Founders
had no need to analyze whether compelled subsidies for speech
operated as abridgments of "speech" within the meaning of the
First Amendment. 95 Outside the more determinate limits on
governmental authority set by fundamental positive rights, 96
natural rights of all sorts-speech-related or not-enjoyed the
same basic protections under fundamental law.
Natural rights at the Founding thus did not impose fixed
limits on governmental power to compel people to tum over
money or resources. In their famous protests against taxation
without representation, for instance, the American colonists
invoked their "unalienable" natural right of property, 97 but this
93
See Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 269-70 (noting the fluidity of
terminology and categories).
94
U.S. CONST. amend IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."); see
Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15, at 307. As argued elsewhere, the
enumeration of retained natural rights in the text of a constitution or bill of rights had
no effect on the judicial enforceability of those rights. See Jud Campbell, Judicial
Review, supra note 15, at 572-76. The same thing was not necessarily true of positive
rights. See id. at 577 ("By the late 1780s, however, enumerating rights was not always
just a declaratory exercise. Constitutional enumeration also had come to provide an
avenue for recognizing the fundamentality of positive rights not supported by
custom.").
95
Cf Baude & Volokh, supra note 6, at 172-94 (extensively analyzing whether being
compelled to give money that is used for speech is an abridgment of "speech" within
the meaning of the First Amendment).
96
See Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15; see discussion, supra note 79, and
accompanying text.
97
See Campbell, Republicanism, supra note 15, at 98.
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argument hardly suggested a general protest against any
governmental authority to tax, nor did it suggest any exemption
from taxes based on conscientious objections. Rather, the taxing
authority was circumscribed by axioms of social-contract theory,
which required representative consent and pursuit of the public
good. 98 The same principles straightforwardly applied to any
other compulsory payments.
B. Compelled Subsidies at the Founding

So far, this Part has proceeded deductively-taking the
framework outlined in Part II and applying it to the problem of
compelled subsidies. A more inductive approach, focused on
how particular Founders viewed the constitutionality of
compelled subsidies for speech, is not feasible for the simple
reason that no such controversies are known. But, debates over
legally compelled payments did arise with respect to another
natural right mentioned in the First Amendment: free exercise.
Evidence from religious-freedom disputes reinforces that
compelled subsidies could implicate natural-rights concerns. At
the same time, however, recorded debates indicate that these
natural rights against compelled subsidization were subject to
legislative regulation, without any suggestion of judicial
oversight. 99
This Part focuses on two sources of evidence: First,
debates in the First Congress over whether those who religiously
objected to bearing arms should have to make an "equivalent"
payment in lieu of militia service, and, second, religiousassessment provisions in various state laws and constitutions.
1. "Equivalents"
As the First Congress convened in 1789, several state
constitutions or declarations of rights accommodated individuals
who religiously objected to militia service. But there was often a
catch. As New Hampshire's 1783 constitution put it, "No person
who is conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness of
bearing arms, shall be compelled thereto, provided he will pay an
equivalent." 100 Several other states had comparable provisions, 101
Id.
Outside ofthis particular context, some early commentators endorsed a judicial
check on extreme abuses oflegislative authority, where there was manifest disregard
for the public good. See Campbell, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 573-74.
lOO N.H. CONST. of 1783, Part I, art. XIII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS
277 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015) (emphasis added).
101
See, e.g., N. Y. CONST. of 1777, § XL, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS
277 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015) ("That all such of the Inhabitants of this State,
being of the People called Quakers, as from Scruples of Conscience may be averse to
the bearing of Arms, be therefrom excused by the Legislature; and do pay to the
State such Sums of Money in Lieu of their personal Service, as the same may, in the
9s

99
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and when the ratifying conventions in Virginia, North Carolina,
and Rhode Island met, they each recommended a federal
constitutional amendment providing "[t]hat any person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted,
upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his
stead." 102 (This practice was also known as paying for a

"substitute.")
Madison responded to these proposals by including in his
original draft of the Second Amendment a concluding provision
that "no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be
compelled to render military service in person." 103 Notably,
Madison's proposal-unlike those submitted by Virginia, North
Carolina, and Rhode Island-seemed to make the issue of
equivalents a matter of legislative discretion, not constitutional
command. 104 The committee that initially revised Madison's
proposals reported-perhaps at the behest of Roger Sherman of
Connecticut 105-a slightly different version, potentially
broadening the scope of the accommodation: "no person
religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms." 106
The removal of "in person" from Madison's initial
proposal did not go unnoticed. When the amendment came up
for debate in the full house, James Jackson of Georgia "moved
to amend the clause, by inserting at the end of it 'upon paying an
equivalent to be established by law."' 107 Conscientious objectors,
in other words, would have to compensate the government for
their refusal to bear arms.
Judgment of the Legislature, be worth."); PENN. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of
Rights, §VIII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 585 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d
ed. 2015) ("That ever member of society hath a right to be protected in the
enjoyment oflife, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to contribute his
proportion towards the expence of that protection, and yield his personal service
when necessary, or an equivalent thereto: But no part of a man's property can be
justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of
his legal representatives: Nor can any man who is conscientiously scrupulous of
bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, ifhe will pay such equivalent; nor are the
people bound by any laws, but such as they have in like maner assented to, for their
common good."). Delaware had an equivalent provision to Pennsylvania's. See
Delaware Declaration of Rights of 1776, § 10.
102
See Mufioz, supra note 49, at 1111 (emphases added) (citing 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 16, 18 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
103
CONG. REG. [Philadelphia], Aug. 17, 1789, reprinted in I I DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 53, 1285.
104
See McConnell, supra note 14, at 1500.
105
The removal of "in person" also appears in a committee draft attributed to Roger
Sherman, see THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 264 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015), and
as noted below, Sherman was a leading opponent of requiring Quakers to pay an
equivalent.
106
House Comm. ofEleven Report (July 28, 1789), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS 264 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015).
107
CONG. REG. [Philadelphia], Aug. 17, 1789, reprinted in I I DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 53, at 1286.
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Jacksons' s proposal impliciated the problem of compelled
subsidies. Many Quakers, after all, did not simply object to
bearing arms in person. They were, as Roger Sherman quickly
pointed out, "equally scrupulous of getting subsitutes or paying
an equivalent; many of them would rather die than do either one
or the other." 108 John Vining of Delaware echoed this claim. 109
To be sure, the funds were not to be used for speech or religious
exercise. But they do implicate the conscience-based logic of
modem compelled-subsidy doctrine. As Sherman and Vining
emphasized, Quakers conscientiously objected to paying an
equivalent because of the way that the funds would be used. 110
From the standpoint of natural rights, however, such
accommodations-although preferable, when possible-were
not absolutely required. "No man can claim this indulgence of
right," Egbert Benson of New York insisted, arguing against a
specific, constitutionally ossified protection for religious
dissenters. 111 A few days later, Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania
echoed Benson's point. Recognizing a right against being
compelled to bear arms, Scott argued, would also bar the
government from collecting "an equivalent." He was not against
such a right as an "indulgence by law." But Scott stressed the
countervailing challenges of administering an accommodation
regime, the importance of maintaining viable militias, and
concerns that atheists might take advantage of the law to avoid
militia service. Consequently, Scott "conceive[d] it is a matter of
legislative right altogether"-not the sort of thing that ought to
be enumerated in the Constitution. 112

108
109

Id. at 1286-87.
Id. at 1287 ("[He] hoped the clause would be suffered to remain as it stood,

because he saw no use in it ifit was amended so as to compel a man to find a
substitute, which, with respect to the government, was the same as ifthe person
himself turned out to fight."). For purposes ofthis paper, what matters is the
perception of Quaker beliefs among members of the First Congress-not the actual
beliefs. On that issue, there is some debate about the extent to which Quakers and
others objected to the payments of equivalents. See Philip Hamburger, Religious
Freedom in Philadelphia, 54 EMORY L.J. 1603, 1606 n.6 (2005).
110
See House Comm. ofEleven Report (July 28, 1789), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL
OF RIGHTS 264 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015); CONG. REG. [Philadelphia], Aug. 17,
1789' reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS,
supra note 53, at 1286.
111
CONG. REG. [Philadelphia], Aug. 17, 1789, reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 53, at 1287. Benson's
reference to "right" in a non-discretionary sense indicates that he was referring to the
lack of any determinate legal immunity (i.e., a fundamental positive right); he was
not, on my reading, saying anything about natural rights, except by implication
denying that those rights translated in this context into determinate legal immunities.
See Campbell, Natural Rights, supra note 15 (distinguishing between natural rights and
fundamental positive rights).
112
GAZETTE OF THE U.S. (Phila.), Aug. 22, 1789, reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 53, at 1308-09.
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Elias Boudinot of New Jersey then defended the proposed
accommodation regime, emphasizing practical and ethical
problems with forcing individuals to violate their consciences.
"What dependence can be placed in men who are conscientious
in this respect?" he asked, noting that "[i]n forming a militia we
ought to calculate for an effectual defence, and not compel
characters of this description to bear arms." 113 People who would
"rather die than use [arms]," Boudinot was suggesting, would
not be very good soldiers. Plus, compelling people to violate their
consciences would violate principles of "justice." 114
At the end of the discussion (the rest of which was not
recorded), the House of Representatives voted to add "in person"
to the conscientious-objector provision, 115 ensuring that
conscientious objectors would not have to bear arms but also, by
implication, accepting that they could be forced to pay an
equivalent. The Senate later rejected the entire clause, though no
records survive explaining why. 116
Only two years later, the topic of equivalents resurfaced
in debates over a proposed bill to regulate state militias. Again,
the issue was not exactly compelled subsidies for speech. But the
payments were to be used in a way that implicated natural rights,
so they provide the best available evidence of how the members
of the First Congress viewed mandatory payments that
potentially abridged First Amendment rights. Once again, the
leading view was to exempt Quakers from militia service but
nonetheless require them to pay an equivalent.
The debate began when Aedanus Burke of South
Carolina spoke out in favor of exempting Quakers not only from
militia service but also from any attendant fines or payments for
non-service. "[I]t was not consonant with the principles of justice
to make those conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms pay
for not acting against the voice of their conscience," he
insisted. 117 Nobody was supposed to "suffer[ ] on account of his
conscientious scruples," Burke explained, "and yet we are going
to make a respectable class of citizens pay for a right to a free
exercise of their religious principles: It was contrary to the
constitution; it was contrary to that sound policy, which ought
to direct the house in establishing the militia." 118
Responding, once again, to the argument against
equivalents was James Jackson of Georgia. Determining who
113

Id. at 1309.
Id.
11s Id.
114

116

Mufioz, supra note 49, at 1116.
GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), Dec. 23, 1790, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS at 115.
117

11s

Id.
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genuinely objected to militia service was a fools errand, he stated:
"Who was to know ... what persons were really conscientiously
scrupulous?" If Quakers and others like them were not even
required to pay an equivalent, Jackson implored, "it was laying
the axe to the root of all militia." 119 "[O]peration of this
privilege," he asserted when debate resumed the following day,
"would ... make the whole community tum Quakers." 120
But Jackson's argument was deeper. He also emphasized
the undergirding prinicples "of the social compact." 121 Those
principles, he noted, required equal treatment as well as
reciprocal recognition of social duties. Requiring Quakers to pay
for their non-service, Jackson insisted, was not a special tax on
their religion. "[I]t is an equivalent for personal service due to
society.... [A]ll should pay it for the benefit of society; some
may pay it in personal service-those averse to this mode should
pay it in money." 122 Jackson, in other words, was arguing against
equivalents from within the framework of social-contract theory,
invoking the undergirding principle of impartial treatment.
Once again, John Vining and Roger Sherman were
outspoken in favor of religious accommodations. Conscientious
objectors, Vining argued, could be required to pay a fine "applied
to a civil use, in which case even the persons scrupulous of
bearing arms could make no reasonable objection." 123
Exempting them from militia service while forcing them to pay
toward militia expenses, however, was "not granting them any
kind of privilege: it is like inviting them to a splendid banquet,
and shutting them out; saying 'walk in gentlemen,' and yet
taking care to keep the door bolted within." 124 Sherman similarly
argued against forcing Quakers to pay an equivalent toward
militia costs, proposing instead that Congress might lay a general
capitation tax that exempted members of the militia, thus
addressing Jackson's concerns about unequal burdens while also
accommodating religious objections. 125 Madison stated his
119

Id.

120

GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), Dec. 29, 1790, reprinted in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791: DEBATES IN
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: TmRD SESSION, DECEMBER 1790-MARCH 1791
160 (Charlene B. Bickford et al. eds., 1996).
121
GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), Dec. 24, 1790, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 120, at 123. This is a different
newspaper report of the same speech by Jackson on December 22, 1790.
122
Id. at 123.
123
PENN. PACKET (Phila.), Dec. 28, 1790, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 120, at 141. This, too, is a different
newspaper report of the debates in the House of Representatives on December 22,
1790.
124
125

Id.

GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), Dec. 29, 1790, reprinted in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS at 163.
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sympathy for this view but-sensing the prevailing moodnoted that granting religious accommodations without requiring
an equivalent was politically "impracticable." 126
Eventually the House decided to leave the issue to the
discretion of each state rather than set a uniform national rule for
militia exemptions. 127 But the debate revealed two points
relevant to compelled subsidies. First, although some
representatives argued that forcing religious objectors to pay an
equivalent would violate the Constitution, and others thought
that not forcing them to pay an equivalent would violate the basic
terms of the social contract, the dominant view was somewhere
between these poles. The issue was, in short, understood as one
within legislative discretion. Certainly nobody suggested that
judges would step in to decide the matter under the Free Exercise
Clause.
Second, although Congress ended up leaving the issue to
the states, the debate revealed a nuanced perspective on how
compelled payments might implicate constitutional principles.
Interestingly, most members of the First Congress who spoke
treated compelled payments as somehow less offensive to
religious freedom than compelled militia service, even though
representatives on both sides of the issue apparently understood
Quakers to be just as opposed to paying an equivalent as to
directly serving in the militia. 128 This poses something of a
puzzle.
Perhaps some people silently agreed with William Giles
of Virginia that compelled subsidies were categorically different
than compelled conduct. "He was in favor of exempting every
many from doing that, which his general conduct evinced was
contrary to his conscience," Giles explained, "but it cannot be
said that it is against the conscience of a Quaker to hold and
possess property." 129 In other words, because only money was at
stake, equivalents posed no threat to conscience. (Decades later,
Massachusetts Justice Thoephilus Parsons famously restated this
126

Id. at 162; see also id. at 164 ("[Madison] said he should acquiesce in an
equivalent-tho he would prefer a gratuitous exemption.").
127
See Militia Act ofl 792, § 2, 1 Stat. 271 (1792) ("[A]ll persons who now are or may
hereafter be exempted by the laws of the respective states, shall be, and are hereby
exempted from militia duty .... ").
128
See, e.g., remarks of James Jackson, DUNLAP'S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER (Phila.),
Jan. 5, 1791, reprintedin 14DOCUMENTARYHISTORYOFTHEFIRSTFEDERAL
CONGRESS at 177 ("Quakers ... pray not for exemption only, but to be exempted
without the payment of an equivalent. It will afford them no redress, nor given them
any satisfaction."); remarks of Roger Sherman, PENN. PACKET (Phila.), Dec. 31,
1790, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS at
149 ("As to their being obliged to pay an equivalent, gentlemen might see that this
was as disagreeable to their consciences as the other.").
129
GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), Dec. 29, 1790, reprinted in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS at 163.
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view, writing that a compelled-subsidy claim "seems to mistake
a man's conscience for his money.") 130
Yet nobody except Giles articulated such an absolutist
approach during debates in the First Congress. 131 Most
representatives, it seems, thought that being forced to pay for
objectionable activities at least implicated principles of religious
freedom-even though such compulsion was not categorically
barred by the First Amendment. Although no speaker explicitly
resolved this paradox, my suspicion is that the general preference
for allowing Quakers not to bear arms in person but nonetheless
requiring payments proceeded from policy-based rationalesexactly the type of assessments of the general welfare that socialcontract theory demanded. As several members noted, for
instance, requiring Quakers to pay an equivalent would help
stem potential problems with fraudulent claims while avoiding
the counterproductivity of including pacifists in the militia. 132
In sum, evidence from the First Congress comports with
the general approach to rights laid out in Part II. Members of the
House-both in discussing the proposed Second Amendment
and in later debates over the militia bill-seemed to think both
that compelled subsidies could at least implicate rights of
conscience and that those duties were not necessarily violations
of the First Amendment.
2. Religious Establishments
Objections to compelled subsidies for religion could
easily arise in the context of religious establishments. And, once
again, the way that the Founders responded to this problem
reveals a diversity of approaches, bolstering the thesis that the
Founders had a less categorical or legalistic approach to rights
than we generally do today.
Many states guaranteed a right against compelled
subsidization of religion as part of the state's guarantee of free
exercise. 133 "[N]o man ought or of right can be compelled to
attend any religious worship or maintain any ministry contrary
to or against his own free will and consent," Delaware's

130
Barnes v. Inhabitants of the First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass. (6 Tyng) 401, 408
(1810); see also Campbell, Religious Neutrality, supra note 46, at 342--43 (discussing the
Barnes case).
131
Of course, newspaper reports of congressional proceedings were not necessarily
comprehensive.
132
See supra Part III.B.1; GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.), Aug. 22, 1789,
reprinted in I I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra
note 53, at 1308-09.
133
Many states did not use the term "free exercise," but they each had (in some form)
a statutory or constitutional guarantee of religious exercise.

276

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol.17

Declaration of Rights stated. 134 These provlSlons did not
necessarily disallow religious assessment schemes, but they did
ensure that opt-out provisions accommodated people who
preferred not to fund a particular religion. 135
Some state protections, though, were less generous with
respect to opt-outs. Georgia and New Hampshire, for instance,
each protected only a right against compelled subsidization of
religious instructors of other denominations. 136 Parishoners did
not have a choice about whether to financially support pastors of
their own denomination. Meanwhile, Massachusetts permitted
individuals to earmark their payments for "the support of public
teacher or teachers of his own religious sect or denomination,
provided there be any on whose instructions he attends;
134

Delaware Declaration of Rights of 1776, § 2, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS 15 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015); see also N.J. CONST. ofl 776, art. XVIII,
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 24 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015) ("nor
shall any Person within this Colony ever be obliged to pay [toward religion] contrary
to what he believes to be Right, or has deliberately or voluntarily engaged himself to
perform."); N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XXXIV, reprinted in id. at 29 ("neither shall any
Person, on any Pretence whatsoever, be compelled to attend any Place of Worship,
contrary to his own Faith or Judgment; nor be obliged to pay for the purchase of any
Glebe, or the building of any House of Worship, or for the Maintenance of any
building of any house of worship, or for the Maintenance of any Minister or
Ministry, contrary to what he believes right, or has voluntarily and personally
engaged to perform; but all Persons shall be at Liberty to exercise their own Mode of
Worship."); PENN. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. II, reprinted in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 31 (Niel Cogan ed.' 2d ed. 2015) ("[NJ 0 man ought to or
of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any
place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will
and consent."); s.c. CONST. of 1778, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 38
(Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015) ("No Person shall, by Law, be obliged to pay towards
the Maintenance and Support of a religious Worship that he does not freely join in,
or has not voluntarily engaged to support."); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I,§ 3, reprinted
in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 39 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015) ("no Man ought
or of Right can be compelled to attend any religious Worship, or erect, or support
any Place of Worship, or maintain any Minister contrary to the Dictates of his
Conscience."); Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom of 1786, reprinted in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 48 (Niel Cogan ed.' 2d ed. 2015) ("That no many shall be
compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place or ministry
whatsoever."). New York's Constitution guaranteed "free Exercise and Enjoyment
of religious Profession and Worship" but did not make any statements about
religious assessments. See N. Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS-25 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015).
135
See, e.g., Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776, § 33, reprinted in THE COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS 17 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015) (permitting the legislature to "lay a
general and equal tax for the support of the Christian religion, leaving to each
individual the power of appointing the payment over of the money collected from
him, to the support of any particular place of worship or minister, or for the benefit
of the poor of his own denomination, or the poor in general of any particular
county").
136
GA. CONST. ofl 777, art. LVI, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 16 (Niel
Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015); N.H. CONST. of 1783, Part I, Art. VI, reprinted in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 22 (Niel Cogan ed.' 2d ed. 2015); see also GA. CONST. of
1789, art. IV,§ 5, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 16 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d
ed. 2015) ("All persons shall have the free exercise of religion; without being obliged
to contribute to the support of any religious profession of their own.").
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otherwise it may be paid toward the support of the teacher or
teachers of the parish or precinct in which the said monies are
raised." 137
Although not always clear, these protections against
compelled subsidization seem to have been part of-and not
merely supplementary to-the right of free exercise. Georgia's
Constitution of 1789, for example, stated that "All persons shall
have the free exercise of religion; without being obliged to
contribute to the support of any religious profession of their
own," indicating that the second clause (against some compelled
subsidies) clarified the first clause (guaranteeing free exercise). 138
Once again, Founding Era evidence shows that
compelled subsidies could implicate not just property rights but
also rights of conscience, depending on how the money was
used. State constitutional provisions further point against any
widespread acceptance of William Giles's argument in the First
Congress that rights of property were entirely separate from
rights of conscience. 139 Nonetheless, the diversity among these
clauses also indicates the lack of any fixed, rigid rule against
forced subsidization that abridged individual conscience.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is long past time for the Supreme Court to reconsider
its reliance on Thomas Jefferson's famous statement that "to
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is
sinful and tyrannical." 140 Not only does evidence from the First
Congress disprove that the framers of the First Amendment were
relying on Jefferson but current doctrine is not even consistent
with his actual views. Plus, modern constitutional interpreters of
nearly all stripes now focus on some form of original meaningnot superficial reliance on isolated statements of particularly
revered "Founding Fathers." As a foundation for modern law,
the Jeffersonian proposition needs to go.
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MASS. CONST. of 1780, Part I, art. III, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS
21 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015).
138
GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV,§ 5, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 16
(Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015). Along similar lines, the Delaware Declaration of
Rights of 1776 coupled the right against compelled subsidization of ministers with a
right against "be[ing] compelled to attend any religious worship"-a right that
clearly fell within the scope of the more general guarantee of "the free exercise of
religious worship" guaranteed in the same provision. Delaware Declaration of Rights
of 1776, § 2 reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 15 (Niel Cogan ed., 2d ed.
2015).
139
See Campbell, Religious Neutrality, supra note 46.
140
JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 545.
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A broader survey of Founding Era ideas about rights of
religious and expressive freedom reveals that modem compelledsubsidy doctrine sits in an uneasy tension with original meaning.
On the one hand, the Founders generally thought that
compelling people to furnish money could at least implicate rights
of conscience. But on the other hand, legal protections against
compelled subsidies were left almost entirely to legislative
judgment, without the judicial oversight that defines our modem
approach to constitutional rights. Looking back to Founding Era
debates about compelled subsidies thus reinforces an important
but often neglected point: The Founders understood the entire
concept of rights very differently than Americans do today.

